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ABSTRACT      This  paper  focuses  on  the  process  of  Europeanization  and  the  extent  to  which  it 
regulates the policies and practices of actors. The literature distinguishes between three phases of 
Europeanization. The first phase deals with Europeanization among the EU member states and the 
constant ‘uploading’ of policies and norms at the EU level and their ‘downloading’ at the national 
level. The second phase of Europeanization relates to the impact of the accession process on states of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The third phase turns our attention to the neighbouring states of the EU. 
It is this final stage that is the central focus of the paper. The aim is to achieve a better understanding 
of how the process of Europeanization might regulate the policies and practices of states that do not 
have the incentive of future membership. Through a case study of Euro-Mediterranean relations on 
energy  and  climate  change  policies  (i.e.  renewable  energy)  the  paper  offers  insights  into  the 
mechanisms,  obstacles  and  implementation  opportunities  for  cross-national  regulation  of  policy 
between members and non-members. 
 
1. Introduction 
   The  concept  of  Europeanization  has  become  a  widespread  phenomenon  since  1990s. 
Despite  mounting  academic  interest  in  the  concept,  Europeanization  remains  a  contested 
concept with researchers offering different interpretations. In general, it has mostly been used 
to describe the EU’s impact on EU Member States and, to a lesser extent, candidate countries. 
Diffusion  of  EU  norms,  rules  and  policies  at  the  domestic  level  captures  the  interest  of 
Europeanization studies from early 1990s till the present (Ladrech, 1994; Börzel, 1999; Risse 
et al., 2001; Héritier, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Negotiation and consensus-building of 
EU policy processes at the EU level added another dimension to studies of Europeanization 
(Radaelli, 2000; 2003; Börzel, 2001a; 2001b). Only recently did research start to focus on the 
impact of the new members at the EU level (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2 
 
2008; Janh and Kuitto, 2011). As the EU keeps enlarging its borders, influence over national 
governments and authority to embrace new EU states, new questions arise about how these 
dynamics are unfolding, which mechanisms advance negotiation and consensus-building and 
how different policy tools and strategies are enacted through various mediating factors to 
produce diverse outcomes.  
   EU membership plays a significant role in the analysis of this puzzle. EU membership 
generates  compliance  with  EU  norms  (EU  Member  States),  while  at  the  same  time 
membership conditionality secures adoption of the whole EU acquis in candidate European 
countries when membership perspective is credible. The absence of EU membership is not 
expected  to  generate  compliance  nor  adoption  of  the  whole  EU  acquis  in  non-European 
countries, since there is a lack of enforcement link in comparison with the case of the first 
two waves.  
   This paper attempts to shed light on Europeanization literature and understand the main 
lessons learnt from the first two waves. Although there is empirical data on Europeanization 
inside  Europe,  there  is  a  lack  of  empirical  data  on  Europeanization  ‘beyond  Europe’  in 
general  and  specifically  on  EU  climate  policies.  Europeanization  inside  Europe  mainly 
focuses on how EU norms and policies are negotiated at the EU level and, then, diffused and 
institutionalized at the domestic level. Instead, Europeanization beyond Europe focuses on 
norm and policy diffusion at the domestic level of non-European countries without taking 
into  consideration  potential  contestation  of  EU  norms  from  non-European  countries. 
Moreover, both EU ‘external governance’ and ‘normative power Europe’ perspectives tend to 
be  speculative  without  providing  empirical  evidence  from  third  countries.  Euro-
Mediterranean  climate  governance  can  provide  useful  insights  in  the  third  wave  of 
Europeanization, although currently empirical evidence of  the mechanisms, obstacles and 
implementation opportunities is lacking.  
 
2. Conceptualising Europeanization 
   Early studies on Europeanization till late 1990s and early 2000s provide useful insights on 
the domestic impact of Europeanization, in several EU Member States and on certain EU 
policies (Ladrech, 1994; Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Later studies focused 
on the ‘cause of effect’ (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009) viewing Europeanization as a ‘two-
way process’ (Radaelli, 2000; 2003; Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Börzel, 2001; Jordan et al., 
2004)  and  introducing  the  idea  of  ‘up-loading’  (Börzel,  2001,  Radaelli,  2000;  2003). 
Research  on  candidate  European  states  for  EU  membership  and  non-European  countries 
captured  the  interest  of  Europeanization  studies  at  a  later  stage  (Schimmelfennig  and 
Sedelmeier, 2005; Lavenex, 2004; 2008; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009).  
   Moving  Europeanization  studies  forward,  Radaelli  captured  Europeanization  as  a 
‘reciprocal’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 3) policy process including both up-loading and 
down-loading of norms, rules, policies and ‘ways of doing things’. Börzel’s study (2001b) on 
‘pace-setters’ and ‘foot-draggers’ introduces several elements that characterise EU Member 3 
 
States when they negotiate and implement policy processes. Moreover, in her study on CEEs, 
Grabbe  (2001;  2003)  introduces  several  policy  tools  and  strategies  –  i.e.  legislative 
compliance, financial and technical assistance etc. – that characterise the top-down process of 
EU policy channels.  
   Coercion, socialisation and mimesis constitute the main mechanisms that drive the process 
of Europeanization. Coercion is connected with the enforcement of policy processes from one 
agent to another leading to compliance. The degree of compliance to an EU policy process is 
secured via Commission’s sanctions, ECJ ruling and the use of conditionality. According to 
Checkel (2001: 3), conditionality is a ‘mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or 
promises to take, certain policy action, in support of which an international institution will 
provide specific amounts of assistance – usually financial or technical’. A second mechanism 
of  Europeanization  is  socialisation  through  social  learning  and  persuasion.  For  Johnston 
(2001:  494),  ‘socialization  is  aimed  at  creating  membership  in  a  society  where  inter-
subjective  understandings  of  the  society  become  taken  for  granted’.  Finally,  a  third 
mechanism  of  Europeanization  is  mimesis.  States  act  mimetically  in  order  to  transpose 
successful  policies  towards  other  states.  Lesson-drawing,  emulation  and  copying  form 
constituent parts of mimesis.  
   Europeanization  mechanisms  are  expressed  through  certain  policy  tools  and  strategies. 
These  policy  tools  and  strategies  vary  from  financial  compensations,  package  deals  and 
transition periods to contractual relations, legislative and regulatory approximation, twinning 
and  advice,  monitoring,  benchmarking  and  gate-keeping  (Grabbe,  2003;  Bomberg  and 
Peterson, 2000; Falkner et al., 2005; Knill and Liefferink, 2007). Various mediating factors 
can both influence the final shape of EU policy processes during consensus-building and 
explore  policy tools  and strategies during the course of diffusion and institutionalisation. 
There are cases where they can  inhibit the whole process as ‘veto points’ (Tsebelis, 1995); 
there are also other cases where they can facilitate, restrain or generate change during the 
formation, consolidation and then transposition and implementation of EU policy processes 
(Cowles et al., 2001; Jordan, 2002; Haverland, 2003). 
   The outcome of these interactions determines the extent to which Europeanization has an 
impact at the domestic level. Jordan et al. (2004) refers to policy content, policy structure and 
policy  style  in  order  to  assess  the  level  of  ‘effect’  Europeanization  produces  in  national 
environmental policies. In the pre-accession period, the role of credibility of rewards (i.e. EU 
membership) as an incentive focuses on the benefits domestic actors and structures can reap 
in order to comply with EU norms (Sedelmeier, 2011: 31). The short post-accession period 
and the ‘scarce systematic comparisons of policy outcome performance’ (Jahn and Kuitto, 
2010:  719)  impede  the  potential  of  this  research  to  provide  additional  explanations  on 
Europeanization in the enlarged EU in terms of the pace of change. 
   However, Europeanization studies mainly focus on the diffusion and institutionalization of 
EU  policy  processes  without  providing  information  on  the  dynamics  of  interaction.  The 
number  of  studies  that  focus  on  the  outcome  of  Europeanization  is  also  limited  to  EU 
Member States and candidate and new EU Members. The lack of an academic consensus 4 
 
reduces  the  impact  of  Europeanization  literature  in  addressing  the  initial  stages  of 
establishing EU policy processes and to what extent it affects domestic structures. Focusing 
on Euro-Mediterranean climate governance, a new conceptualisation of Europeanization is 
attempted  focusing  mainly  on  the  contestation  of  Euro-Mediterranean  climate  policy 
processes  and  the  role  of  Europeanization  mechanisms  in  the  negotiation,  diffusion  and 
institutionalization of EU policy processes.  
 
3.  Europeanization  inside  Europe:  EU  Member  States  and  candidate  European 
countries for EU membership 
3.1 The first wave of Europeanization: EU Member States 
   In the first wave of Europeanization among EU Member States, the negotiation of policy 
channels has attracted minimum attention (Börzel, 2001a; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Jordan 
et al., 2011). EU membership carries several rights and obligations for all EU Member States 
to  maintain  the  sustainability  of  EU  internal  market.  Pace-setting  and  foot-dragging  EU 
Member States (Börzel (2001b)) have the right to influence the negotiation of EU policy 
processes through contestation, coalition-building and lobbying at the European Commission. 
The preventive stance from pace-setters minimises several domestic costs, contributes to a 
comparative  advantage  toward  other  EU  Member  States  and  accommodates  to  a  certain 
extent  national  interests  and  domestic  actors’  preferences  (Börzel,  2001a;  2001b;  Jordan, 
2002; Jordan et al., 2004; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). On the other hand, foot-draggers face 
serious problems of forming and ‘up-loading’ national preferences at the EU level because of 
the lack of effective administration and cohesive representation of national preferences at the 
EU level. In EU climate policy, foot-draggers such as Spain, Greece and Portugal negotiate 
with  pace-setters  (Germany,  the  Netherlands)  their  consent  asking  for  financial  and  time 
compensation i.e. financial assistance and transition periods (Börzel, 2001b; Jordan et al., 
2004). 
   EU membership requires transposition and implementation of EU policy processes at the 
domestic level and effective action to cope with the increasing number and high quality of 
EU  policy  processes.  There  are  different  levels  of  transposition  and  implementation  for 
various countries. The first wave of Europeanization mainly focuses on policy sectors such as 
environmental policy, road haulage, telecommunications, foreign policy and social matters 
(Börzel, 2001b; Jordan, 2002; Thatcher, 2004; Héritier, 2001; Smith, 2000; Falkner et al., 
2005). The theory focuses on the ‘adaptational pressures’ exerted on domestic structures and 
the role of ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ (Risse et al., 2001). Domestic actors, state culture, veto points, 
policy networks and policy entrepreneurs constitute the main actors that are involved in the 
effective transposition of EU policy processes.  
   Coercion, socialization and mimesis are the main mechanisms of Europeanization among 
EU Member States. Coercion is exerted by all EU members, EU institutions and domestic 
actors,  since  pace-setters  push  for  an  increased  level  of  regulation  that  could  better 
accommodate  national  interests  in  the  policy  process  through  the  ‘first  move  advantage’ 5 
 
(Knill and Liefferink, 2007). For foot-draggers, coercion refers to a compensatory nature, 
since their consent – not blocking – has to be followed by financial or time compensation. 
Socialisation through persuasion and social influence promotes coalition-building and interest 
accommodation  among  EU  Member  States.  EU  Member  States  promote  their  ideas  and 
interests through argumentative persuasion and communicative interaction to convince other 
Member States. Coalitions enhance the role of these entrepreneurs, since they can form either 
blocking or consensus-building groups. Mimesis is combined with socialisation, since ‘actors 
borrow ideas in order to improve their performance in comparison to others’ (Börzel and 
Risse, 2009: 12). But, as Börzel and Risse argue (2009: 12), lesson-drawing, emulation and 
copying mechanisms are the least understood with regard to the EU.     
   Change induced by Europeanization at the domestic level differs in relation to policies and 
countries. In EU environmental policy, Jordan et al. argue (2004: 138-9) that EU membership 
puts  pressure  on  all  EU  Member  States  to  develop  new  coordination  structures  and 
institutional  procedures  in  order  to  understand  how  EU  environmental  policy  operates. 
According to Falkner et al. (2005), in the long run all member states seem to comply with EU 
requirements, but with various responses and at different levels. However, only a few studies 
fully assess the level of change produced by Europeanization (Héritier, 2001; Jordan et al., 
2004). Moreover, the analysis of the bottom-up policy process of Europeanization is not 
integrated in the analysis, while at the same time there is an inconsistency in Europeanization 
studies to examine in the long run whether and to what extent Europeanization influences – 
or not – domestic structures and the EU as a whole.  
 
3.2 The second wave of Europeanization: the case of Central and Eastern European countries 
   The second wave of Europeanization refers to the expansion of EU policy processes beyond 
EU Member States with EU membership as an incentive. The main difference between the 
first and the second wave refers to the ‘external projection of internal solutions’ of the EU to 
candidate  European  countries  (CEEs)  (Lavenex,  2004:  695).  The  literature  of 
Europeanization to the CEEs is concerned with analysing the extent to which EU policy 
processes are transferred to these countries. As in the first ‘wave’ of Europeanization, there is 
a lack of adequate studies in explaining the negotiation of policy processes between the EU 
with candidate European countries. 
   In this wave, EU membership generates different incentives and obligations for European 
countries that aspire to become members of the regional trading bloc. The main and most 
important incentive for the CEEs is EU membership. Other incentives are participation in the 
internal  market,  common  rules  and  participation  in  decision-making,  funding,  political 
stability as part of a coalition of states and international credibility as EU members. In order 
to gain access into the EU, candidate European countries are required to transpose all EU 
acquis into their domestic legislation. If a candidate European country does not transpose EU 
acquis and membership obligations at the domestic level, membership cannot be attributed to 
the candidate. If a candidate European country transposes part of the EU acquis, access to 6 
 
specific  policies,  funding  and  technical  assistance  is  offered  but  without  voting  rights 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  
   The literature of Europeanization toward candidate European countries pays little attention 
and holds an ambiguous stance to the bargaining position of CEEs and their interests. In some 
studies, certain CEEs (i.e. Poland) had a say in the negotiations of the various patterns of 
relationship with the EU mainly due to their geo-strategic position, but without offering much 
explanations on that issue (Grabbe, 2001; on textiles and coal Mayhew, 1998). There are 
other studies (Papadimitriou, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2008) 
which argue that ‘the candidates had no say in the creation of the rules, and thus cooperation 
lacked “ownership”’ (Sedelmeier, 2008: 811).  
   The literature mainly focuses on the ‘selective and patchy’ implementation of EU policy 
processes at the domestic level of the CEEs in the pre-accession association period before 
credible EU membership perspective is given to the CEEs (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 
2010; Grabbe, 1999; Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier, 2005). Diffusion 
depends on whether the EU sets certain policy processes as necessary conditions (e.g. EU 
environmental  policy)  and  on  the  consistency  and  persistence  of  such  requirements 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004). 
   In  the  first  pre-accession  association  period  (1991-1996),  EU  membership  was  not  a 
credible option for the CEEs. Moreover, EU financial and technical aid, visa facilitation and 
preferential  trade  were  not  significant  and  conditional  on  good  governance  terms 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). The size of adoption costs was significantly high for the CEEs, due 
to the lack of a democratic past in these countries (Mayhew, 1998; Grabbe, 2003; Sedelmeier, 
2008). There was the perception in CEEs that the impact of the EU was low in comparison 
with other international institutions until 1997 (Grabbe, 2001).    
   With  the  introduction  of  Opinions  in  May  1997,  the  European  Commission  produced 
annual reports assessing each candidate’s progress in conforming to Europe Agreements and 
to  Copenhagen  criteria
1. Although in Europeanization among EU Member States each 
Member State reports annually to the Commission based on its own estimates, in this wave it 
is the Commission that estimates, assesses a nd reports on the progress of each CEE. EU 
conditionality over each CEE was reinforced through a revision of  its funding programme; 
EU aid was conditional on EU acquis implementation, while at the same ti me  twinning 
contributed to deliver capacity-building (Bailey and de Propris, 2004). 
   The application of stricter conditionality over the CEEs in the second pre -accession period 
(1997-2002) is related to the asymmetrical bargaining position between the EU with each 
CEE (Grabbe, 2001).  Stricter EU conditionality combined with credible EU rewards (EU 
                                                           
1 a)  stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities, b) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union and c) the candidate's ability to take 
on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union. 7 
 
membership) produced increased levels of diffusion of EU policy processes (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2005). The more CEEs were getting closer to full membership, the more 
domestic  opposition  was  increasing  and  EU  conditionality  had  to  be  applied  in  order  to 
surpass  domestic  opposition  (Grabbe,  2003).  Socialisation  was  mostly  influential  in 
persuasion  and  social  influence  of  CEE  elites  (Sedelmeier,  2011:  11).  Strict  and  highly 
centralised monitoring and sanctioning with a potential ‘suspension’ of EU membership put 
an added value to the strict conditionality attributed to the CEEs. In the first wave, there are 
no clear benchmarks which can measure the implementation of an EU policy process. In the 
case of CEEs, Opinions set out the main priorities ‘jumping from description to prescription 
without a detailed analysis of the problems and how to overcome them’ (Grabbe, 2001: 1022).  
In  the  post-accession  period,  several  studies  focus  on  the  compliance  rate  of  EU  policy 
processes at the CEEs’ domestic level and others on the role of communist legacies in the 
institutionalisation of these norms (Sedelmeier, 2008; Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010: 
434;  Steneunberg and Toshkov,  2009). The lack of  a bottom-up analysis cannot  provide 
secure conclusions about the impact of CEEs’ preferences at the EU policy processes. 
 
4. Taking stock of Europeanization inside Europe: the third wave of Europeanization 
   The expansion of EU policy processes takes place not only to candidate European countries, 
but also outside Europe to countries without EU membership as an incentive. With the 2004 
and 2007 EU enlargements, the external borders of the EU acquired neighbouring countries 
to its eastern and southern borders. South Mediterranean countries (SMCs) cannot apply for 
EU membership, since, according to Copenhagen criteria, they are not European states (1993: 
13).  
   A common element between Europeanization within and beyond Europe is the existence of 
several  incentives  that  run  through  the  whole  spectrum  of  Europeanization.  Trade 
opportunities  offered  by  the  EU’s  Internal  Market  can  be  seen  as  an  incentive  both  for 
insiders  and  outsiders  to  consider  harmonization  with  EU  norms.  Financial  assistance  is 
another common element. In the first wave, side payments are offered to the foot-draggers in 
order not to block certain EU policy processes from pace-setting EU Member States. In the 
second  and  third  waves,  candidate  European  and  non-European  countries  are  offered 
financial assistance via bilateral contractual relations so that they can deal with capacity-
building issues and harmonization with the EU acquis. 
   Moreover, in the first wave and in certain cases in the second wave (i.e. before a credible 
membership perspective), the role of domestic actors and veto points facilitate, impede or 
delay the implementation of an EU norm at the domestic level. Formal institutions play a 
significant role in the implementation of an EU Directive or the EU acquis. Also, although 
‘foot-dragging’ EU Member States are equal members in the EU and have an equal footing in 
the decision-making process, but they are unable to ‘up-load’ their preferences at the EU 
level. Candidate European countries had also limited chances to influence the dynamics of 
interaction with the EU. However, these dynamics may differ in the case of SMCs, since 8 
 
several SMCs are significant exporters of energy resources to the EU and potential exporters 
of  electricity  through  renewable  energy.  Low  level  of  public  administration,  low 
specialization  and  the  need  of  capacity-building  (Blue  Plan,  2008)  are  common 
characteristics with ‘foot-dragging’ EU Member States and the CEEs.  
   Another common element in all three waves is benchmarking, setting goals and monitoring 
the process of implementation. While in the first wave EU Member States send out national 
data to the Commission, in the second and third wave it is the Commission that is responsible 
for collecting data and reporting on the implementation of EU norms and/or the reform rate 
of  each  country.  Moreover,  enforcement  through  ECJ  decisions  can  lead  to  financial 
sanctions  for  non-compliant  EU  Member  States.  For  candidate  European  countries,  strict 
conditionality can produce enforcement, since non-credible membership perspective lead to 
‘patchy  and  selective’  implementation  of  several  EU  policy  processes  (Cirtautas  and 
Schimmelfennig, 2010). In the third wave, Casier’s study (2011) on phytosanitary issues in 
Israel and Jordan’s public finance management shows a ‘partial, uneven and selective’ rule 
transfer to ENP countries. 
   Mechanisms hold a different role in all three waves of Europeanization. Coercion is mainly 
used  when  financial  and  time  concessions  are  required  between  EU  Members  and  when 
further implementation of the EU acquis is required for candidate countries. It also takes 
place at all levels of EU policy processes at the first wave, whereas at the second it is exerted 
to domestic structures. Socialisation is common element in all three waves, since dialogue 
and argumentative interaction is mainly used at various bilateral and multilateral co-operation 
frameworks.  In  the  third  wave,  multilateralism  (EMP,  UfM)  runs  in  parallel  with 
‘differentiated bilateralism’ on a one-by-one basis between the EU with each SMC through 
ENP Action Plans (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005). Mimesis is less easy to be traced, but it 
is combined with socialisation or even with coercion as in the case of CEEs (Sedelmeier and 
Schimmelfennig, 2005).  
   There are two theoretical perspectives that attempt to capture the impact of the EU outside 
Europe without EU membership as an incentive. Several researchers focus on the theoretical 
perspective of EU’s ‘external governance’ (Lavenex, 2004; 2008; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; 
Lavenex and Winchmann, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Lavenex, 2011). The 
focus  is  mostly on top-down policy processes  without mentioning the negotiation of EU 
norms with non-European countries. It also shows that EU policy processes are given fact for 
countries outside Europe. EU external governance literature focuses on policies like energy, 
environment  and justice and home affairs.  In  general  terms, the EU external  governance 
perspective tries to understand how and why EU policy processes are transferred outside EU 
territory (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 795). EU external governance focuses on rule 
transfer (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Casier, 2011) and how other means such as network 
governance can explain how the obstacle of the lack of EU membership as a final objective 
for these countries can be overcome.  
   Lavenex  and  Uçarer’s  study  on  asylum  and  immigration  policy  (2004)  argue  that  less 
coercive and more voluntary means of influence are for the case for neighbouring countries. 9 
 
Lavenex  and  Winchmann  (2009)  argue  that  socialisation  through  horizontal  network 
governance rather than hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality can be applied to 
non-European  countries.  Network  governance  through  regulatory  agencies  and  structures 
between the EU with ENP countries could emerge as new form of political interaction, by-
passing the hierarchical mode of strict conditionality (Lavenex, 2008). Later studies on EU’s 
external governance identify the importance of sectoral governance in the expansion of EU 
internal policies (Schimmelfennig, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009) and they argue 
that the EU could offer regulatory membership in certain EU policies following the example 
of European Free Trade Area countries (EFTA EEA)
2 (Lavenex, 2011). However, they do not 
provide any  empirical data on how enforcement has been or could be   achieved in non-
European countries. In the case of EFTA EEA countries, judiciary monitoring is offered by a 
Court that acts as a settlement of disputes mechanisms in trade and other related issues 
between the EU and these countries.  Could this be extended to non-European countries by 
including integrated judiciary monitoring or EFTA-like Court in order to promote enhanced 
enforcement? 
   Another theoretical perspective focuses on the normative impact of the EU outside Europe. 
The main representative of this theoretical framework is Ian Manners (2002) with his study 
Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. This perspective focuses on the use of 
soft  power  based  on  persuasion  and  routinization  of  practices  on  the  basis  of  ‘core’ 
(democracy, rule of etc.) and ‘minor’ (social rights, sustainable development etc.) norms. 
Promoting these norms at the international level, the EU attempts to frame the ‘language of 
international society’ which stems from its own security experience in peaceful co-operation 
and integration (Carwell, 2011; Manners, 2002; Smith, 2000). These norms are promoted not 
only at the international level but also through EU’s bilateral and regional relations. Drawing 
on the theoretical perspective of normative power Europe, Federica Bicchi (2006: 287) agrees 
with  Manners’  ‘universality  of  EU  norms’  and    argues  that  EU  foreign  policy,  although 
intentional, can be characterised as an ‘unreflexive attempt to promote its model. In relation 
to EMP and the South Mediterranean, Bicchi also refers to ‘standardisation of practices’ and 
the repetitive pattern of ‘routine-based behaviour’, since by ‘talking the talk’ and ‘practicing 
the practices’, the repetition of social communication leads to change in actors’ reciprocal 
disposition. However, although Manners focuses on the abolition of death penalty in his case 
study, the lack of empirical data provides room only for speculation.  
   Europeanization beyond Europe constitutes a new area of understanding in Europeanization 
literature which intends to examine the level of contestation of EU policy processes outside 
Europe with countries that do not aspire and are not able to have EU membership as an 
incentive. Unlike in the case of the first two waves, Europeanization beyond Europe provides 
incentives  of  compliance  to  EU  policy  processes  (a  stake  in  the  Internal  Market,  visa 
facilitations,  financial  and  technical  assistance,  multilateral  co-operation,  legitimacy  etc.) 
which were characterized as intermediate incentives in the case of CEEs. Moreover, unlike in 
the case of the first wave, there is no judicial monitoring under European Commission and 
                                                           
2 Norway, Lichtenstein, Iceland (Switzerland is only part of EFTA Agreement) 10 
 
ECJ ruling, but instead political monitoring at bilateral and multilateral level and via EC’s 
annual reports as in the case of CEEs. This research intends to examine the bargaining role of 
SMCs in each model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance. The focus on climate policy 
and governance will shed light on whether and to what extent EU is a normative power 
(Manners, 2002) towards non-European neighbouring countries. By exploring these questions, 
this paper will examine whether EU’s bargaining position as a regional economic hegemon 
can  influence  domestic  actors  in  SMCs.  The  absence  of  membership  incentive  and 
enforcement,  the  lack  of  membership  conditionality,  the  promotion  of  ‘shared  values’ 
through joint ownership and the idea of equal partnership promote various interpretations for 
Europeanization  beyond  Europe.  In  the  following  two  sections,  the  third  wave  of 
Europeanization  will  be  examined  through  the  prism  of  Euro-Mediterranean  climate 
governance. 
 
5. Europeanization beyond Europe? Governing climate change in Euro-Mediterranean 
relations 
    The  Mediterranean  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  climate  change  (IPCC,  2007).  Euro-
Mediterranean  climate  relations  are  governed  around  dense,  contradictory  and  complex 
structures of ‘overlapping’ (Cardwell, 2011) institutional frameworks. Despite the lack of 
explicit climate governance structures in Euro-Mediterranean relations, climate change forms 
an integral part in this system of multilateral, bilateral and project-based cooperation. Many 
SMCs  have  significant  energy  resources  and  all  have  significant  potential  for  harnessing 
green energy thus contributing to the reduction both of their own carbon footprint in CO2 
emissions and of other countries.  
   There are two main actors in the region that attempt to institutionalise climate governance: 
UNEP and the EU. Established in 1975, the Mediterranean Action Programme of UNEP 
provides a stable institutionalised framework of multilateral co-operation through meetings 
among  all coastal  countries  and the EU under  the Barcelona Convention and its  various 
Protocols.  The institutional  framework of the Barcelona Convention is based on biennial 
ministerial meetings of the Contracting Parties, which monitor its process of ratification and 
implementation.  Financial  and  technical  assistance  is  provided  via  regional  donors  (i.e. 
France, Spain, EU) and through loans from international or regional funding institutions (EIB, 
WB). Despite regional political tensions such as the Israeli-Palestinian issue, UNEP’s role as 
a broker of various interests brought together various perspectives for intensive co-operation, 
whereas increasing interest is expressed by the EU. Since 2005 the European Commission 
attempts to enhance its co-operation with the UNEP MAP Secretariat aiming at a more stable 
environmental and climate relationship. 
   On  the  other  hand,  the  EU  constitutes  the  regional  hegemon  that  can  offer  various 
incentives  for  climate  co-operation  to  the  SMCs  focusing  on  multilateral  and  bilateral 
relations (EMP Association Agreement) followed by regional and bilateral projects. Initiated 
in 1995, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is a multilateral attempt to raise issues like 11 
 
political,  economic,  and  cultural  issues  including  environmental  co-operation  under  the 
second pillar of economic co-operation. It combines institutionalised multilateral Euro-Med 
meetings, bilateral contractual relations (EMP Association Agreements) between the EU with 
each SMC – which outline EMP’s commitments based on each SMC’s needs – and regional 
and bilateral projects.  
   Launched in 2004, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is based on bilateral relations 
and projects between the EU with each SMC. Each SMC signs an Action Plan with the EU 
for a certain period up to five years, which then can be either renewed or upgraded leading to 
an ‘advanced status’ partnership and further access to EU rewards. The main EU rewards for 
ENP countries are a stake in the Internal Market, financial and technical assistance, visa 
facilitations, twinning, access to specific EU policies without voting rights and joint position 
in global issues. ENP Action Plans specify certain priorities based on the EMP Association 
Agreements. Unlike EMP, ENP focuses mainly on the approximation of SMCs’ legislation to 
the EU based on several incentives offered by the EU (Weber et al., 2007). 
   In 2008, after President Sarkozy’s initiative, the EU launched an updated version of EMP, 
the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). It aims to build on and reinforce the successful 
elements of the EMP by substituting it providing more concrete and visible projects to the 
citizens. Flagship regional projects are the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the de-pollution of 
the Mediterranean.  
   In developing our understanding of climate governance in the region, we can distinguish 
between three forms of Euro-Mediterranean climate co-operation: a) multilateral governance, 
b)  EU-SMC  bilateral  relations,  and  c)  project-based  cooperation.  Each  form  of  Euro-
Mediterranean climate governance provides different opportunities and challenges for each 
SMC to promote its own interests and increase leverage during negotiations. 
   At  the multilateral  level  of Euro-Mediterranean climate relations,  EU initiatives  can be 
characterized as mainly focusing on ad hoc attempts of dialogue, interaction and information-
exchanging  fora.  Under  EMP,  although  in  its  early  stages  the  discourse  of  Euro-Med 
ministerial  ministers  referred  to  climate-related  issues  such  as  renewable  energy,  energy 
efficiency and desertification, only in 2007 was climate change introduced in the agenda 
(Euro-Med foreign affairs meeting in Lisbon, 2007). At a sectoral level, meetings under EMP 
environmental  ministerial  meetings  are  highly  fragmented  with  a  lack  of  routine-based 
structure.  After  the  third  meeting  in  2006,  no  other  sectoral  Euro-Mediterranean 
environmental ministerial meeting took place in relation to environmental and climate issues 
(the first was in 1997 and the second in 2002). Moreover, after the launch of UfM, progress 
in  multilateral  political,  climate  and  environmental  issues  has  stalled  mainly  due  to  the 
stalemate of UfM, the continuous Arab-Israeli instability and the latest developments due to 
the Arab Spring (Gillespie, 2011). 
   On the other hand, UNEP MAP meetings show a sustainable institutionalised and routine-
based  framework  of  interaction  between  North  and  South  Mediterranean  environmental 
ministers along with EU Institutions through socialisation and social learning, whereby most 12 
 
of its members, NGOs and epistemic communities show increasing interest to co-operate 
among each other. Although the introduction of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM) Protocol introduces climate change as an integral part of the discussion under UNEP 
MAP structure and its institutionalisation in the co-operation, its entry into force in March 
2011  has  yet  to  show  any  results  in  the  region.  The  introduction  of  the  Compliance 
Committee in 2009 under UNEP MAP provides an interesting development in the region. It 
provides technical assistance, interpretation of the legal texts and recommendations to the 
Contracting Party that fails to comply with UNEP MAP rules. It could be argued that this 
Compliance Committee introduces for the first time a mechanism which mainly focuses on 
the effects of socialisation and social learning, although more empirical evidence is required. 
Technical assistance goes in hand with the initial idea of Med Plan, but now it becomes 
integral part of the co-operation. Moreover, this compliance committee attempts to explore 
the process of environmental protection rules beyond the prescriptions of soft law. Upcoming 
field research will examine which countries promoted this committee and will also explore its 
potential as an institutionalised advisory body on Mediterranean environmental and climate 
regulations. 
   In  order  to  establish  closer  connections  with  that  sustainable  conventional  multilateral 
framework, the EU promotes enhanced co-operation with UNEP MAP via the 2005 Joint 
Work Programme followed by a progress report in 2008. It is stated (UNEP MAP, 2006: 2) 
that ‘particular attention will be given to strengthen the environmental dimension of public 
policy, to promote sustainable development policies and to support European Commission 
activities in the implementation of relevant EU environmental policies and the ENP […]’. 
Moreover, the inclusion of regional flagship projects such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan 
and the de-pollution of the Mediterranean under the UfM indicate that the EU intends to 
influence regional climate relations through the legitimised framework of UNEP MAP and 
combine it with concrete regional projects that may have an impact in the region. By aligning 
with the Secretariats of UNEP MAP and UfM, the EU attempts to regulate indirectly regional 
climate policies through transgovernmental networking (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
However, the lack of empirical data and scientific studies in the region leave space only for 
speculation at this stage. Field research intends to cover this empirical gap.  
   An  initial  understanding  from  the  multilateral  aspect  of  Euro-Mediterranean  climate 
governance is that the Europeanization mechanism of coercion cannot be an option at this 
stage. Although the EU and its Member States contribute mostly in the UNEP MAP’s Budget 
and via technical assistance, it seems that UNEP MAP membership signifies regional co-
operation  through  interaction  and  socialisation  upon  common  norms  of  environmental 
protection, technological transfer and know-how and sustainable development through loose 
monitoring.  On  the  other  hand,  although  Euro-Mediterranean  environmental  co-operation 
under EMP and UfM offers more opportunities for the EU to expand its regulation to the 
SMCs, the stalemate in regional Euro-Mediterranean relations limits the scope of any kind of 
coercion, socialisation or even mimesis. The incapacity of the EU to provide viable solutions 
at the regional level impedes any efforts for legitimised solution under EMP or UfM (Bicchi, 
2011). Moreover, bilateral benefits are more easily negotiated with the EU rather than among 13 
 
22 actors under UNEP MAP, 27 actors under former EMP, not to mention 43 actors under 
UfM.  Therefore,  socialisation  through  social  persuasion  and  leading  by  ‘example’  under 
UNEP MAP can offer the chance to the EU to influence its neighbours. However, the lack of 
literature limits the scope of this research for any further conclusions on the contestation from 
rich SMCs in energy resources and with significant potential in harnessing renewable energy. 
   At  the  bilateral  model  of  Euro-Mediterranean  climate  governance,  bilateral  relations 
between the EU and the SMCs appear to determine the progress of climate governance in the 
region.  EMP  Association  Agreements  introduced  the  issue  of  renewable  energies  in  the 
agenda of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean climate relations. The temporally uneven entry into 
force of EMP AAs (ranging from 1997 to 2005), the low interest on climate issues under 
EMP and the lack of concerted financial assistance by the EU produced limited outcomes in 
the region (Ugür and Tovias, 2005). Instead, ENP provides the opportunity for each SMC to 
develop its own specific framework of cooperation with the EU. Bilateral EU and SMCs’ 
priorities in the climate sector are affected neither by the unstable regional political climate 
nor  by  the  lack  of  regional  dialogue  at  an  EMP  or  UfM  level.  ENP  Action  Plans  have 
introduced  climate  change  and  renewable  energies  as  integral  parts  in  the  cooperation 
between  EU  with  each  SMC.  APs  set  out  certain  priorities,  whereby  each  SMC  has  to 
undertake in order to approximate to EU’s legislation. Regulatory approximation to the EU 
has to be followed by compliance with international commitments in the area of climate 
change such as UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Cancún Agreement etc. Approximation to EU 
legislation is combined with financial and technical assistance by the EU through FDI, low 
interest loans and twinning as part of the broader finality of participating in the long run in 
the EU’s Internal Market and in other EU policy sectors.   
   Although at the initial stages of ENP (2004-5) climate change constituted a less intensive 
collaboration sector, by the entry into force of most ENP Action Plans (mostly between 2005-
07)  the  cooperation  in  this  sector  focuses  on  preparing  projects,  enhancing  regulatory 
convergence  and  technical  assistance  and  promoting  co-operation  and  accession  to 
international and regional climate frameworks. During the later stages of implementation of 
ENP,  climate  change  mitigation  increased  its  importance  and  complemented  the 
implementation of UfM Mediterranean Solar Plan. Moreover, bilateral EU-SMC Association 
Councils discuss also the issues of climate change and renewable energies. Moreover, annual 
reports from the European Commission monitor the evolution of reforms under ENP APs and 
the rate of compliance in adopting EU-SMC commitments and delivering projects.  
   Unlike with the case of CEEs, only those countries that are willing to reform are those that 
promote progressive enhancement or even gradual approximation to the EU norms. In several 
cases, the national targets for renewable energies are identical or even emulated with those of 
the EU. Israel is in the final phase of developing a low emissions carbon energy master plan 
for the period up to 2050, while Morocco is in process of developing a low-emissions plan 
for the period up to 2030 (EC, 2010b; 2010c). This shows that the fact that climate change 
and energy policies form significant part of the EU agenda, this triggered these countries to 
implement long-term objectives as these EU rules are ‘legalised and legitimised’ (Lavenex 
and  Schimmelfennig,  2009:  802).  Mitigation  to  climate  change  (i.e.  renewables,  energy 14 
 
efficiency) and the general framework of combating climate change seem to put forward 
climate co-operation between the  EU with  each ENP.  They also  coincide with  the EU’s 
commitments under Kyoto Protocol and the promotion of renewable energy under EMP.  
   Although  the  EU  intends  to  expand  its  policy  processes  to  countries  beyond  Europe, 
conditionality in the area of climate and energy policies is quite absent at the moment. Instead, 
the  EU  intends  to  trigger  implementation  of  reforms  to  these  countries  through  soft 
mechanisms  of  shaming  and  praising  via  political  and  report  monitoring.  Bilateral 
Association Councils between the EU with each SMC clarify implementation problems and 
discuss the issues of climate change and renewable energies every year. In the Association 
Councils,  SMCs  can  also  contest  EU’s  perspectives  or  even  suggest  other  forms  of  co-
operation. In 2006, given its opposition to proceed to further contractual relations with the 
EU in ENP, Algeria ‘proposed to the EU that a strategic energy partnership be considered as 
a policy response to both parties’ aspirations in this sector’ (Darbouche, 2008: 382) and as a 
response to alternative aspect of increased sectoral co-operation. Its opposition to an ENP AP 
led Algeria to suggest an Algerian version of an ‘ENP-like’ Action Plan which set out the 
implementation of the Algerian EMP Association Agreement (Algerian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2005). Given the EU’s vulnerability at the given time in 2006 due to Russian energy 
disruptions,  Algeria  asked  for  visa  facilitations  and  support  to  the  WTO  application 
procedure. Being the biggest SMC exporter of energy resources to the EU, its bargaining 
position increased during the third EU-Algerian Association Council with the inclusion of 
renewable energy in the proposed ‘energy partnership’ (Darbouche, 2008: 382-384).  
   Differentiated bilateralism (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005) via socialization and elite 
learning constitute the framework of co-operation between the EU and the SMCs. It could 
also be argued that the selective adoption of EU policy processes by the SMCs (Casier, 2011) 
holds common characteristics with the CEE pre-accession period, whereby non-credible EU 
membership perspective was attributed to these countries. In the case of SMCs, the lack of 
EU membership and other credible ‘intermediate’ incentives reinforce this selectivity of EU 
rules. Even being the most enthusiastic SMC with the EU, Morocco expects a clearer political 
vision for the ENP for further enhancing its alignment with EU rules,  while at the same time 
it is eager to promote more bilateral rather than regional relations (Kelley, 2006; Gillespie, 
2008). However, the absence of studies in the diffusion, institutionalisation and the final 
reaction from domestic actors restricts our understanding in Europeanization beyond Europe, 
whereas  at  the  same  time  it  does  not  provide  enough  understanding  on  the  causal  links 
between  European  norms  and  SMCs’  adoption  and  final  compliance  with  EU  policy 
processes. 
   The  project-based  model  of  Euro-Mediterranean  climate  governance  is  based  upon 
multilateral  and  bilateral  commitments.  Moreover,  the  UfM  Solar  Plan  focuses  on  the 
regional  dimension  of  cooperation  on  mitigation  to  climate  change  (Darbouche,  2011). 
Though,  an  agreement for common Euro-Mediterranean renewable energy  rules  that  will 
regulate all relevant aspects of this Solar energy market has yet to be agreed (Escribano, 
2010). Moreover, after the Arab Spring, SMCs are in transition in their political systems 
contributing to a further slowdown of these regional projects.  15 
 
   On the other hand, climate projects at a bilateral level seem to advance at a better pace than 
at  regional  level.  Although  Arab-Israeli  relations  were  deteriorating  from  2009  onwards, 
bilateral projects continue at a significant pace, as the European Commission progress reports 
mention (ENP progress report, 2010). Moreover, there is a tendency of establishing bilateral 
projects under ENP which are under the branding of MSP at a bilateral level (i.e. wind farm 
in Egypt, solar power plant in Jordan). Moreover, EU funding opportunities provide more 
secure environment for those SMCs wishing to produce more approximation and regulatory 
convergence to EU’s climate and energy legislation. Increased funding through ENPI and 
low  interest  loans  through  FEMIP  and  Neighbourhood  Investment  Facility  are  shown  as 
important incentives that can promote even further the potential of project-based cooperation 
in Euro-Med climate governance.  
   Moreover, annual  progress  reports  give the chance to the EU to  monitor the extent of 
reforms  undertaken  in  each  country,  promote  greater  visibility  and  institutionalise  the 
implementation  of  EU-SMCs’  contractual  commitments  at  a bilateral  and at  international 
level  the  progressive  implementation  –  or  not  –  of  their  contractual  commitments  at  a 
bilateral  level  but  at  international  organisations.  Monitoring  of  establishment  of  Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, ratification – or not – of a Protocol under the 
Barcelona  Convention  or  association  with  UNFCCC,  Cancun  Agreement,  Copenhagen 
Accord are introduced in the annual reports provided by the Commission.  
   However, the lack of studies in the field cannot provide further information about the role 
of domestic actors in response to these projects and the administrative difficulties in the 
implementation of such commitments. Moreover, field research in the following months will 
explore potential trade-offs that take place during the annual EU-SMC Association Councils 
and whether regional and/or bilateral projects attract more attention from SMCs to develop 
their institutional capacity in response to climate change and, finally, adopt and comply with 
EU policy processes.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
   The different Euro-Mediterranean climate governance models embody different levels of 
negotiation  and  contestation  between  the  EU  with  the  SMCs  at  a  regional,  bilateral  and 
project-based  level.  Coercion,  socialisation  and  mimesis  are  identified  as  the  main 
mechanisms  for  Europeanization  in  the  first  two  waves.  The  absence  of  membership 
incentive and enforcement, the lack of membership conditionality, the promotion of ‘shared 
values’ through joint  ownership and the idea of equal  partnership  under ENP  promote  a 
different  normative  understanding  of  the  EU  beyond  Europe.  Also,  the  EU  external 
governance perspective can be seen as speculative on the diffusion of EU policy processes to 
countries outside Europe. It also provides no understanding on the dynamics of interaction of 
EU policy processes with third countries.  
   At the multilateral model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance, socialisation through 
social influence and persuasion can be seen as the most viable mechanism for the EU to 16 
 
trigger compliance from the SMCs. The institutionalised framework of UNEP MAP offers 
opportunities  for structured dialogue, potential influence and  certain  regional benefits  for 
climate  governance,  but  it  limits  the  scope  of  trade-offs  for  resource  abundant  SMCs  in 
natural  gas  and/or  with  significant  potential  for  developing  renewable  energy.  In  this 
framework,  the  EU  attempts  to  bring  together  its  power  as  a  regional  climate  actor  and 
significant donor with the legitimacy of UNEP structures and with other regional actors such 
as the UfM Secretariat via transnational networking (Lavenex, 2011). Such an attempt may 
increase the level of trade-offs that take place at the regional level, since the EU is willing to 
have increased leverage in regional political issues.  
   The research so far shows that regional political issues i.e. Israeli-Palestinian conflict along 
with other issues such the Arab Spring and the stalemate in UfM Summits reduce the scope 
of leverage for the EU. SMCs’ limited interest in multilateral climate governance under EU 
initiatives is justified both by the EU’s unwillingness to play a significant and concerted role 
as an actor in regional political issues and by the continuous EU initiatives that do not show a 
clear  commitment  to  multilateralism  in  Euro-Mediterranean  relations  (Bicchi,  2011). 
Moreover,  Euro-Mediterranean  membership  in  regional  structures  includes  a  significant 
number  of  actors  from  43  countries.  This  impedes  any  regional  effort  in  climate  issues. 
Although UfM objective was to bring clear outcomes and benefits to the region via specific 
projects, its politicization restricts its effectiveness and limits any future regionalisation of 
climate relations (Gillespie, 2011). 
   Instead,  flexibility,  differentiation  and  co-ownership  are  key  elements  that  promote  the 
bilateral model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance. Although EU incentives are less 
intriguing than in the case of CEEs, intermediate incentives such as visa facilitation, financial 
and  technical  assistance,  twinning  and  the  ultimate  goal  of  a  stake  in  the  EU’s  Internal 
Market provide better and more secure framework of co-operation. Moreover, each SMC is 
in a better position to influence policy processes and ask for more concessions as in the case 
of foot-dragging EU Member States. Although SMCs are not EU members and not even 
aspire  to  become  EU  members,  interdependence  between  the  EU  and  the  SMCs  can  be 
considered as significant, since the EU is dependent both on geographically close, diversified 
and secure energy supplies in order to reduce its energy insecurity and its carbon footprint 
(Adelle et al., 2009). Also, SMCs are in need of exporting energy to the EU in order to 
develop  their  economies  and  contribute  to  economic  growth  and  limited  unemployment, 
especially after the Arab Spring. Rich SMCs in energy and with potential to produce and 
export ‘green’ energy to the EU are found in a position to influence policy processes at a 
negotiation with the EU and ‘up-load’ their own preferences (i.e. Algeria). 
   Bilateral climate relations under ENP can offer significant leverage for each party. Annual 
political monitoring via EU-SMC Association Councils and EC’s reports on the progress of 
SMCs in approximating to EU rules are instruments to control political co-operation. Under 
this stable framework, climate change issues are integrated into the broader framework of EU 
norms  of  respect  of  human  rights,  good  governance,  rule  of  law,  market  economy  and 
sustainable development. Approximation to these norms gives access to those willing and 
committed SMCs to demand further stake in the EU’s Internal Market and to other incentives. 17 
 
The more SMCs align with these pre-agreed commitments, the more they can claim more 
access to the intermediate EU rewards. However, future field research will explore who set 
those pre-agreed commitments, what trade-offs were agreed and whether other mechanisms 
were utilised by each party. 
   Finally, regional projects follow the path of political instability that impedes any further 
development of enhanced relations in climate change mitigation projects such as the UfM 
MSP.  Instead,  bilateral  projects  under  ENP  show  a  more  legitimate  route  for  the 
implementation of the commitments between the contracting parties. Moreover, projects can 
provide a means for SMCs to claim more trade-offs in the climate and energy sector, if their 
implementation is successful and self-sustained. Projects constitute a test for domestic actors 
and structures to comply with international and bilateral commitments. Monitoring offered by 
the European Commission and via the Association Council can exert socialisation pressures 
to SMCs to incorporate EU rules, but also SMC’s willingness for better trade-offs in areas of 
strategic importance for the EU. 
   Upcoming field research will shed light on the role of SMCs’ and domestic actors in the 
establishment of the bilateral and project climate relations with the EU and the extent to 
which  EU  is  a  normative  power.  It  will  also  examine  whether  other  aspects  of 
Europeanization mechanisms are used in the ‘extraterritorialisation’ of EU norms to non-
members (Lavenex, 2004) and what  is  the  role of SMCs  in  the contestation  of  all three 
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